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Most of the investors usually rely on sophisticated analytical methods in making
their investment decisions, but it is not true in PRC investments. In my case study, I
found that investors in the PRC tend to put greater weight on their subjective
judgements and feelings, which based on their common sense and experience, than
scientific analysis. Basically, their decision making process has four stages: 1) investment
climate analysis 2) strategic advantages/ disadvantages analysis 3) quantitative economic
value analysis and 4) contractual terms considerations.
Shell Hong Kong Company Limited is now faced with three investment alternatives:
1) to build Tsing Yi plant 2) to acquire China Sun Oil plant and 3) to build Tsing Yi
plant and acquire China Sun Oil plant. Based on the above framework of analysis, we
find that the second alternative- to acquire China Sun Oil plant- will generate the
highest economic value to Shell. However, the contractual terms will be very critical to
the success of the joint venture. Also, since investment in the PRC involve greater risks,
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PREFACE
Investment in the People's Republic of China (PRC) has become a hot discussion
topic since China adopted the open-door policy in 1978. Undoubtedly, some investors
are making huge profit in their investments in the PRC, but at the same time even more
investors are losing money or getting into trouble in their investments. Though we have
already had a lot of theories about PRC investments, they seem to be incapable of
providing useful guidelines for foreign investors. This is the main reason why I prefer
to choose a real case to study.
The purpose of this paper are two-fold: 1) to establish a decision model for foreign
investors and 2) to analyze the investment alternatives of Shell Hong Kong Company
Limited so that we can see under what circumstances Shell (investors) will choose to
invest in China instead of Hong Kong.
The results of my analysis has convinced me of three things: 1) investor's experience
and degree of acquaintance with China play important roles in making an appropriate
investment decision in China 2) the objective investment climate of the PRC sounds
good, especially in SEZs; and 3) the contractual terms stipulated in the agreement are
the key factors for the success of a joint venture- it implies that negotiation skills and
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relations with Chinese officials are extremely important.
Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Sun's
General Manager, Mr. Wu Zhiping, and Shell's Lubricant Manager, Mr. Linus Ng, for
their support to this research paper. Also, I would like to thank Dr. Robert H Terpstra





The mainland China, though far from a promised land of milk and honey,
is an exciting place with tremendous opportunities for ambitious entrepreneurs.
In the early '80s, shortly after PRC's implementation of open-door policy, foreign
investors were attracted by the vast but largely unexplored China market. They
held the view that the one-billion population in the mainland constituted a large
consumption market in which they could earn a billion even if each Chinese
spent a dollar in their products.
However, their dreams were broken as the Chinese officials clarified that
what they really needed were investment in hi-tech and export-oriented industries,
not in consumer-durables industries which just for domestic uses. As a result,
most investors were seriously burned and lost money just after they took the first
step to the door of the mainland China.
Coupled with the zig-zag pattern of economic policy, which added another
source of uncertainty to foreign investors, so investors are reluctant to put more
money into China especially for those large, long term investment projects.
Noting the reducing overseas investment and discontent from investors, the
2
Chinese Government had taken some measures, which included a series of
preferential treatments to foreign enterprises and joint venture, to boost the
deteriorating investment environment. Nonetheless, investors still take an
extremely cautious approach toward PRC investment.
Sun Refining and Marketing Company, the leading marketer of lube oils in
the US, entered a joint venture agreement with China Petrochemical (SINOPEC)
International in 1984. This included building a US$6.5 million lube oil blending
and packaging plant in China's Shekou Industrial Zone. This joint venture-
known as China Sun Oil Company- was the first-ever petroleum blending and
packaging industry foreign investment inside China. The plant now is fully
operational.
The majority partner in this joint venture is Sinopec International which
owns 55% shares, while the other partner, Sun Company, owns 45% shares.
The China Sun plant occupies nearly 220,000 square feet of land in Shekou,
Shenzhen. It has an initial capacity of 50,000 metric tons per annum (mtpa),
producing all grades of lubricating oil, including automotive, industrial lubricants
and process oils. Base oils, one of the essential elements in lube oils blending, are
supplied by China.
A Sun subsidiary, known as Sun Oil Far East, Inc. in Hong Kong, is
responsible for marketing China Sun products within Far East region. This
company also appointed Lithcon Petroleum Limited, a Hong Kong-based
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company established in 1983 to assist in the formation of the joint venture and
market Chinese Petroleum products abroad, as marketing agent.
Sun's initial aim is to export 70-80% of its production. However, the
inaccessibility of large markets in some South East Asian countries such as
Thailand and Malaysia due to duty barriers makes the possibility of achieving this
target slim. On the other hand, as lube market in China is dominated by several
oil giants like Mobil and Shell, Sun's relatively weak market penetration in China
makes domestic sales an impracticable way to absorb all the un-sold products
either. Coupled with management problems in the joint venture, Sun is now
considering to sell outright its shares in China Sun Oil Company.
Meanwhile, Shell Hong Kong Company Limited, being one of the market
leader of lube oils in Hong Kong and the Mainland China, is planning to expand
its production capacity. Its original plan was to establish a plant in Tsing Yi,
Hong Kong in order to cater for the steadily growing demand in both Hong Kong
and China. After knowing Sun will sell out its shares in China Sun Oil, Shell has
shown strong interest in acquiring the shares and started to discuss with Sun
concerning this matter.
In effect, Shell has three alternatives in its expansion projects:
1) to build the plant in Tsing Yi;
2) to acquire the Shekou plant only; or
3) to built the Tsing Yi plant and acquire the Shekou plant at the same
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time.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the respective pros and cons of the
three alternatives. First of all, I will develop the methodology of analysis in the
next chapter. Then, in chapter 3 and chapter 4, I will try to expose all relevant
information about the two parties- China Sun Oil Limited and Shell Hong Kong
Limited- involved in this case. In chapter 5 and 6, qualitative analysis about the
investment climate in China and strategic considerations of Shell will be given.
Then, I will evaluate the investment alternatives quantitatively in chapter 7.
Afterwards, I will try to list out some key factors that Shell need to pay particular





After several interviews with the Lubricant Manager of Shell, Mr. Linus Ng,
and the General Manager of Sun, Mr. Wu Zhiping, I found that they share the
same view in making their investment decision in the mainland China. Generally
speaking, they put much emphasis on China's overall investment climate in their
decision making process. They tend to break down the investment climate into
two broad categories: political environment and economic environment. Then, the
next step is to evaluate the strategic advantages and disadvantages of the
investment project. However, in such early stage of analysis, evaluations are
largely based on common sense and experience.'
If the investment project is considered to be beneficial to the company in the
first stage, then a more concrete and detailed financial evaluation of the project
will be conducted. At the same time, they will start to dig out more facts and to
consider the practical operational problems and difficulties that will probably be
encountered in the future. Finally, the company will list out a set of conditions
1 According to Mr. Linus Ng and Mr. Wu Zhiping, they both
said that doing business in China should depend more on common
sense and experience than on sophisticated analytical techniques.
They thought their experience and relations with Chinese
officials could tell them even more about the profitability of
investment projects. Both Ng and Wu have more than 10 years'
experience in China.
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under which it will accept or reject the investment project. In other words, the
company is going to find out both the ideal conditions and bottom-lines so that
it can fight for the best within these limits in the process of negotiations.
DECISION MODEL



















Based on the above information, I devised a decision model for China
investors as shown above.










Essentially, this decision model is consistent with Professor Mun Kinchok's
analysis about important factors of PRC investment and investors' behaviour in
China.2 In this paper, I will basically follow the above model as the basis of
analysis in this case.
However, concerning the quantitative financial evaluation of investment
alternatives, both Shell and Sun have not mentioned their method of analysis they
usually employ. In this case, I will use the Discounted Cash Flow method.
However, for such a complicated case, it is not easy to estimated all possible
future cash inflows and outflows. As our result will be affected by infinite number
of variables ranging from global economic environment to lube market conditions
and from international political affairs to company administration, so we need to
simplify our model a little bit so that we can concentrate our effort on some
important areas and ignore the less important parts. That means simplification
is inevitable in order to allow us to only focus on some significant variables so
that it can be used again in similar situations.
First of all, we need to make some main assumptions:
1) component costs is the same for all three alternatives
2) distribution costs is the, same for all three alternatives
3) no significant discrepancy between estimated and actual demand
4) both local and international inflation rate are zero.
2Mun Kinchok. Evaluation Methods of Investment Climate. p. 14
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Secondly, we have identified some key parameters:
1) taxation rate




6) change in working capital.
The value of these parameters will be very different in different situations.
For example, the plant capacity required in Alternative 1 (Tsing Yi plant only)
and Alternative 2 (Shekou plant only) will be different from that required in
Alternative 3 (both Tsing Yi and Shekou plants). The former cases will be
designed to cater for both Hong Kong and China markets, while the latter will
be designed to serve these two markets separately by two plants. As a result, we
need to estimate the respective value of parameters case by case. Finally, we can




HISTORY OF CHINA SUN OIL LIMITED
The establishment .of China Sun Oil Limited was the result of nearly four
years of discussion between Sinopec International and Sun since 1980. After
detailed negotiation between the two parties, the joint venture agreement was
finally signed on 7 August 1884. In order to let readers have more understanding
about the whole case, I will first give details of the partners and the operation
and management of China Sun in this chapter.
The Partners- Sinoec
Perhaps, China Sun Oil would have been established several years later had
the China National Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC) not been established
in 1983. Sinopec was created by State Council and holds a status equivalent to
an industrial ministry, but is distinct from a ministry in being chartered as a
profit-making enterprise. Responsibility System is applied to Sinopec- it
assumes full responsibility for its profit and losses and will pay taxes and retain
3all after-tax profits, including foreign exchange earned. Such capitalistic feature
3Fujimoto, Akira. Progress in China's Enterprise Retorm.
China Newsletter 68(May-June 1987): 2-6.
Chai, Joseph C.H. China's Industrial Responsibility
Systems. China Briefing, July 1983.
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of Sinopec has encouraged it to raise funds from foreign investors through
forming joint venture.
Sinopec is China's largest corporation with registered capital and combined
assets of Y21 billion. It inherited the nation's 39 largest refineries and
petrochemical manufacturing facilities from 3 separate existing ministries:
Petroleum, Chemicals and Textiles. The primary task of Sinopec is to eliminate
the inefficiencies and duplication of facilities created by the more than two
decades in which different ministries engaged in similar areas of refining and
petrochemical manufacture without adequate reference to one another. It is also
responsible for the overall planning and management of production and the
import and export business in China's petrochemical industry (see Appendix 1).
Actually, Sinopec's foreign trade activities are mainly centered on its wholly-
owned subsidiary- Sinopec International. Sinopec International basically acts as
the first point of contact for foreign companies. It is also the only part of Sinopec
empowered to negotiate and sign foreign joint ventures valued at more than Y5
million. For this reason, China Sun Oil, which has initial registered capital of
US$6.5 million, is a joint venture formed under Sinopec International.
The Partners Sun Refinery and Marketing Company
The other partner is Sun Refinery and Marketing Company, which is a
subsidiary of US-based Sun Company, Inc. Today the company is the third largest
producer of lubricants in the USA and has significant worldwide operations. Sun
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owns 45% China Sun Oil, while the remaining 55% is owned by Sinopec
International. The joint venture is the first-ever investment in a petroleum
blending and packaging operation in China by a foreign company.
China Sun Oil Limited
The China Sun plant occupies nearly 220,000 sq.ft. of land in Shekou,
Shenzhen. It has an initial capacity of 50,000 metric tons per annum (mtpa),
producing all grades of lubricating oil, including automotive, industrial lubricants,
and process oils (see Appendix 2). It is also facilitated with modern high-speed
barrel-packing equipment and a well-equipped laboratory for quality control and
manufacturing process testing.
Base oils are supplied by China's Maoming refinery whereas Sun supplies
the expertise to run the plant as well as specialist
lubricating oil additives.
The agreement between Sinopec International and Sun runs for 15 years to
2000 and it may be extended by both sides through negotiation six months before
the term expires. It is stipulated on the agreement that the whole plant will
belong to Sinopec after the term expired. Therefore, Sun could get nothing except
cash released from working capital if it decided not to renew the contract. On the
contrary, if a new agreement can be reached after the expiration of the old
agreements, then both sides need to make additional investment into the
company. Of course, the amount of investment and the detailed terms and
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conditions will only be discussed in 2000.
The China Sun Oil Company is under the leadership of the board of
directors with general manager taking charge of the company. President of
Sinopec International, Zheng Zhongfang, is the Chairman of the boards of
directors and President of Sun, Mr. Campell, is the vice-chairman of the boards
of directors. The company's general manager will be appointed by the US side
while two deputy general mangaer will be appointed by the Chinese and US
sides.
As far as marketing China Sun Oil's products is concerned, it appointed
Lithcon Petroleum limited, a I-Iong Kong-based company established in 1983 to
assist in the formation of the joint venture and market Chinese petroleum
products, the marketing agent. According to the President of Lithcon Petroleum,
Mr. Frederick Ho, the primary market for the output of the plant will be
Southeast Asia. He estimated that, in the coming five years total Hong Kong
demand for lube oils at between 30,000 and 40,000 tons per year, while demand
throughout Southeast and East Asia, excluding China and Japan, is in the region
of 1.3 to 1.5 million tons per year. The rapid economic growth of Southeast Asian
countries offers promise to the future lubricating oil market.
It is unlikely that much of the plants output will be sold directly to China
since it cannot generate foreign exchange earnings. However, China Sun Oil can
still tap the China market indirectly through the Hong Kong-based China
Resources Company which buys lube oils on the international market for
13
shipment to China. The joint venture is now gradually strengthening its business
ties with China Resources.
14
Chapter 4
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF SHELL HONG KONG COMPANY LIMITED:
HONG KONG AND THE PRC
Shell Hong Kong Company Limited has been very active in both Hong Kong
and the PRC. Shell's present business activities in Hong Kong and China will
certainly have great influences on its expansion strategy. So, before we go to
analyse the investment climate of China and its strategic considerations in the
investment projects, it is better for us to have some ideas about Shell's present
business activities first.
Company Background
Shell Hong Kong Company Limited is one of about 300 operating companies
of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies. It is incorporated in HK on 1
January 1988 to manage all of Shell's business activities and installations in HK.
Previously, Shell's Hong Kong business was managed by a UK incorporated
company called the Shell Company of Hong Kong Limited.
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Shell Hong Kong limited is one of four companies know collectively as "The
Shell Companies in China and Hong Kong (SCCHK). The other companies are
Shell Developments (H.K.) Limited, which looks after Shell's interests in its joint-
venture installations in China and develops other new business activities; Shell
China Limited, which maintains a Beijing liaison office and Shell Exploration
(China) Limited. The shares of these companies are jointly owned by Royal
Dutch Petroleum Company and The Shell Transport and Trading Company.
Shell's HK Business Activities
Shell is the market leader in oil products in Hong Kong. It operates the
largest network of retail filling and service stations in HK. Shell has two depots
in HK: one in Kwun Tong and another in Ap Lei Chau. Kwun Tong has storage
tanks and distribution facilities for the entire range of Shell products available in
HK, whereas Ap Lei Chau was built primarily to service HK Electric Company's
oil-fired power station on Hong Kong Island.
However, Shell is now planning to move all of its HK operations to a new
installation at Tsing Yi. When Tsing Yi is completed it will be one of the most
modern Shell oil and chemicals storage and distribution facilities in the world. It
is expected to be fully operational by 1992.
The first section of Tsing Yi to come into operation will be the LPG storage
and distribution plant. It is still studying whether a lubricating oil blending plant
should be built in Tsing Yi, which will be discussed in this paper later.
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Business Activities in China
Shell has been very active in China. It has already started its business in
China since 1960 in marine bunkering and lubricants sales. Following China's
open-door policy, Shell' Developments (H.K.) Limited was incorporated in Hong
Kong in 1976 to develop joint ventures and other business with China. A few
years later Shell China Limited, with a Beijing liaison office, and Shell
Exploration (China) limited, were also set up.
In 1985, Shell opened its first joint venture, Hua Ying in Shekou, Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone (SEZ). A second joint venture also commenced
operations at Chiwan in 1987. It is the first depot in any SEZ to have bulk
storage facilities for LPG. The depot also supplies a variety of high-quality
petroleum products, lubricants and chemicals to consumers and industries both
inside and outside the SEZ.
In addition, Shell is involved in a joint venture with Esso China Limited to
explore for oil and gas in three contract areas in the South China Sea4. By its
substantial presence and extensive business in the Mainland China, Shell has
4The joint venture has already signed 3 contracts with The
National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) concerning offshore oil
exploration:
i) at the 39/11,block in the South China Sea in Nov.1985
ii) at the 40/01 block in the South China Sea in Aug. 1983
iii) at the 04/27 block in the South China Sea in Aug.1983.
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already developed strong business relations with China. And there will be even
more opportunities for Shell to establish more business in the form of joint
venture in China.
New Opportunity in China
In late 1987, Sun started to contact several oil giants to sell out its
lubricating oil blending and packaging plant in Shenzhen, which has just been in
operational for less than two years. The main reason to sell the Shenzhen plant
is its relatively weak market penetration in both Southeast Asia and China which
makes it difficult to absorb all the products produced from the plant.
At that time, Shell was just considering the establishment of a similar plant
in Tsing Yi. Therefore, Sun Co.'s Shekou plant provided one more opportunity
for Shell's expansion plan. Finally, Shell came up with three different alternatives
in its expansion plan:
Al: to build the plant in Tsing Yi only
A2: to acquire the Shekou plant only
A3: to build the Tsing Yi plant and acquire the Shekou plant at the
same time.
In the following chapters, I will analyze the pros and cons of these three
alternatives by employing the decision model developed in previous chapter.
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Chapter 5
INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN CHINA
China's economic reform has turned some foreign investors' dreams ten
years ago into reality. The ever-improving investment environment has attracted
more and more investors to pour their money into one of the last unexploited
area in the world. The recent austerity programme announced in 1989 National
People's Congress was seen by most investors more as a new opportunity than
threat since foreign investors, especially for those in hi-tech industries, are not
affected by the belt-tightening programme. Investment in Special Economic
Zones (SEZ) and the 14 open coastal cities are still growing.
Since the overall investment environment is usually the determining factor
for most of the investors to make their investment decisions in China, so in this
chapter I will examine some specific opportunities open to Shell if it is to invest
in China Sun's plant.
Political Environment
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Although political reform had been proposed for several years, China's
political and legal systems is still under-developed. The main reason for the
setback is the strong opposition from the conservative hardliners. Opinions about
political reform are divided among the leaders- the conservatives withhold that
status quo should be maintained in China in order to provide a stable
environment for economic growth, while the reformists believe that the existing
economic reform must accompany with corresponding changes in China's political
system.
Today China has a larger degree of toleration to different views, including
dissidents' criticism. Yet, power is still concentrated in the hands of a small group
of political elites. Deng Xiaoping, who holds the office of the Chairman of the
Central Military Commission, is still the paramount leader of China. Some
hardliners like Chen Yun and Peng Zhen, though no longer the standing
committee members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo now, can
still exert considerable influences on China's political arena.
Deng's hand-picked successor, Zhao Ziyang, who is also the CCP Secretary
general, seems that he does not possess the charisma to lure sufficient support
from the old cadres. Being widely recognised as a reformist, Mr. Zhao once
proposed to separate the function of party and government. But the old cadres
showed little support to this proposal. Recently, Mr. Zhao is even being blame
for the spiralling inflation and over-heated economy, which have already caused
state-wide discontent in China. It is rumoured that Zhao's position as the party's
number one man is at 'stake and the Premier Li Peng, characterised as a
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conservative, is going to grab the power from Zhao5.
It is quite clear that there is no unity among the leaders. Instead, they are
divided into two camps- conservatives, led by hardliners like Chen Yun and
Premier Li Peng, and reformists, led by Deng Xiaoping and party Secretary-
general Zhao Ziyang. Although Deng is still holding tightly the military power
and appears to be the number one man in China, the old cadres have
considerable powers to influence Deng's decisions which can be reflected from
the event that Deng's right hand man Mr. Hu Yaobang, former party Secretary-
general, was forced to resign for being accused of mishandling student riots in
1986.
Nonetheless, voices demanding democracy are growing louder and louder,
especially from the intellectuals6. Some even openly criticize government policies
and Marxism and propose to introduce Western-style democracy into China,
which were taboos some years ago. Though the government did try to suppress
them, the actions taken are much more moderate compared with Mao's era.
There are signs that the Chinese government will be growing more tolerant,
enlightened and open-minded, no matter how slow it is.
Perhaps, the present political situations now China experiencing is the most
stable one since 1949. But the stability hinge on the health of the 84-year-old
5Delfs, Robert. Politics on Hold. Far Eastern Economic
Review, 20 April 1989, p.12.
6Rosario, Louise. "Peking Spring Returns. Far Eastern
Economic Review, 23 March 1989, p.19.
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paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. If he died one day, power reshuffle among the
younger leaders might cause some degree of instability in China. However, the
present economic reform, which is widely supported by the public, is highly
unlikely to change in the future. The possibility of China going back to its old
road is very low.
Economic Environment
Generally speaking, the Seventh Five-year plan (1986-1990)7 adopted at the
Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress is the blueprint for
China's future economic development. It formed the basis of China's economic
polices. In the Seventh Five-year Plan, it included two separate sections which
laid out guidelines in relation to foreign investments in the PRC: (1) Use of
foreign funds and (2) Import of technology.
(1) Use of foreign funds
During the Seventh Five-year Plan period (1986-1990), China will give
priority to the following areas where foreign funds will be used:
(a) energy, communications, telecommunication and new materials, industries,
and especially power, port and petroleum projects as well as the technical
7Zhao, Ziyang. "Report on the 7th Five-year Plan. Beijing
Review 16(1986): 6-8.
The 7th Five Year Plan of the People's Republic of China
for Economic Social Development (1986-1990).
Beijing Review 17(1986): 2-3.
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upgrading of machinery and electronic enterprises which, infrastructural in nature,
are expected to provide the necessary backup for the next phase of development
of the country's economy and
(b) the on-going efforts to expand the country's exports to generate more foreign
exchange earnings and produce import substitutes, the purpose of which is to
create the necessary conditions whereby the country's payment capability will be
raised and the scale of foreign fund utilization will be expanded.
It implies that China will continue to absorb direct foreign investment and
welcome foreigners and companies to establish joint ventures and coproduction
or contractual joint venture enterprises and wholly foreign-owned enterprises on
the basis of equality and mutual benefit.
In order to attract more foreign funds, efforts are being made to improve the
investment climate. The areas under attention are i) China's law and decrees
relating to its foreign business and protect the legitimate rights and interests of
foreign investors ii) infrastructural development and iii) services and
management provided for foreign investors.
In addition, according to the 22-point Provisions issued by the State Council
for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, all SEZs had taken more
concrete measures to further attract foreign investment. For instance, the
standards for land use fee were reduced or even exempted for some
technologically advanced projects. The levels of other charges had also been re-
23
adjusted, and firm measures were taken to stop the practice of charging
unreasonable fees on enterprises involving foreign investment. Meanwhile, efforts
were made to simplify the procedure of examination and approval for foreign
investment projects. Administrative departments for foreign investment
enterprises and foreign investment service centres were set up to help foreign
investors with their difficulties, render consulting services and handle matters of
appeal.
2) Inflow of foreign technology and talent
Selective and planned import of foreign technology and hiring of foreign
talent is an important way to promote the progress of China's science and
technology. The priority in technology import will be given to the technical
upgrading of existing enterprises and to import of those technologies and
equipment which are helpful to increasing the capability of producing more
exports and import substitutes.
Apart from attracting foreign funds and importing technology, the above
guidelines set in the Seventh Five-year Plan aimed at improving the investment
structure. By the end of 1985, we can see that the majority of foreign investments
were in hostels and apartment houses (Table 1). At the same time, the main
source of foreign investments were come from HK (Table 2 ).Such phenomenon
is regarded as extremely unhealthy and should be corrected as soon as possible.
Therefore, the emphasis is now on diversifying the sources of foreign funds and
balancing the area of investment.
24
Table 1
Orientation of International Investment%
July 1979- December 1985















Although the Seventh Five-year Plan seems to have no direct relation with
this case, it is very important to foreign investors as it shows the determination
and commitment of the Chinese government to economic reform and its open
door policy.
Furthermore, we can tell from the Seventh Five-year plan that the direction
of China's economic development will be moving towards hi-tech industries. So
hi-tech industries might have the lowest risk of unfavourable policy changes or
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cutbacks. Therefore, the risk involved in investing in a hi-tech lube oils blending
and packaging plant is minimal.
Table 2
Breakdown of Sources of Foreign Investments
July 1979- December 1985
RemarksInput of fundsCountries and
(US$100 million)regions





















Since 1981, China's GNP has been growing at an annual average rate of
9.98%. Basically, the engine of this spectacular growth has been, first agriculture,
and later rural industries. From 1978-87, the share of agriculture in total social
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output dropped from 22.54% to 20.5%, while the share of construction,
commerce and transport grew from 16.5% to 20%. Industry maintained a
constant share of 60% for the same period.
The growing wealthier rural areas and SEZs have led to a dramatic increase
in demand for consumer durables. The soaring food and consumer durables
prices has fuelled China's over-heated economy. The official inflation rate
announced in 1988 was around 20%, but some economists estimated that the real
figure should be double than that.
Faced with the spiralling inflationary pressure, the Chinese officials
announced a series of austerity programmes. It included clampdown on
investment, tighter control over money supply and bank credit, restoration of
state trading monopolies and fixed price ceilings on steel products, non-ferrous
metals and other major industrial raw materials. In a few words, the central
government is trying to seize back its control over the economy after several
years' economic reform.
Though Premier Li Peng reiterated this belt-tightening policy in this year's
National People Congress (NPC)8, it met strong opposition from representatives
of provincial and municipal government. Guangdong Governor Ye Xueping even
openly pleaded for Peking to spare his province from austerity because it relies
8Delfs, Robert. Tighten Your Belts. "Far Eastern Economic
Review, 30 March 1989, p.10.
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on foreign market and raw material, and does not compete for scarce resources
at home. It is expected that more such pleas would be heard later. So, whether
the central government can hold the grip tightly is still doubtful9.
On the other hand, the austerity programme does represent an opportunity
to foreign investors since foreign investments are not included in the programme.
Moreover, some technology-intensive industries and infrastructural constructions
are even encouraged by the central government. So, foreign investments in these
categories still can receive the same preferential treatments as before 10.
9Rosario, Louise. "Peking's Growing Pains." Far Eastern
Economic Review, 5 January 1989, p.54-55.
Rosario, Louise. "The China Syndrome." Far Eastern Economic
Review, 6 April 1989, p.76-77.
10"Rules Concerning Income & Taxes the Unified induszria.L a
Commercial Tax in China' s SEZs, Economic & Technical




STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS OF SHELL'S INVESTMENT
In considering the strategic advantages of the alternatives, we can simplify
the question a little bit by just focusing on the strategic advantages of investing
in China Sun Oil's plant. Shell's operation in HK has been doing very well and
there is no reason for it to move all or part of its business to another place. In
the first place, Shell may not be very familiar with doing business in China. In the
second place, investment in China has a greater political risk than that in HK.
Even worse, due to the proximity of geographical location between HK and
Shenzhen, there is virtually no geographical advantage in marketing its products.
Then, what are the advantages of buying the Shekou plant?
In this chapter, I have identified three main advantages of China Sun Oil's
plant: 1) stable supply of base oils 2) stronger foothold in China market and 3)
better relationship with Sinopec.
Stable Supply of Base Oils
One of the indispensable ingredients of manufacturing lubricating oils is base
oils. High-quality lubricating oils can only be produced from high-quality base
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oils. Now, Maoming refinery is supplying high-quality base oils to China Sun Oil.
If Shell abandoned the ideas of acquiring China Sun Oil plant, it has to import
base oils from various sources like Singapore, Indonesia and Dalien. Both the
supply and quality of base oils will be more uncertain and be affected by more
external variables.
Meanwhile, base oils from Maoming refinery will be transported via an
existing pipeline to a loading terminal at Zhanjiang, and then shipped by coastal
tanker to a jetty in front of the China Sun site. Finally, base oils will be
transmitted through a one-kilometre pipeline from the jetty to the plant.
Therefore, the transportation costs will be lower.
One interesting arrangement is that the Chief Engineer of Maoming
Petroleum Industry Corp was appointed to be the vice-presidents of China Sun.
It demonstrated Maoming's heavy commitment to the plant. So, it is more certain
that both quantity and quality of supply of base oils will be guaranteed.
Stronger Foothold in China MarketT
Lube oil market in China is becoming more and more competitive. Today
Mobil is the market leader in China and its most popular product is Delvac 1130.
Shell ranks second after Mobil.Its products are growing to gain greater
acceptance from the market. Its best sellers are Rotella SX30 and Shell Super
2000. Caltex has some strength in certain parts of the southern China, but is quite
a -long way behind Mobil and Shell, while Esso and Castrol are not very
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competitive at all in China's lube oil market.
Generally speaking, the competition in China's lube oil market is a positive
sum game. The rapid industrial growth in China will demand more lube oils in
the future. The question is whether Shell can gain a larger share in this growing
market so as to overtake its number one competitor- Mobil.
In fact, one obvious advantage of buying China Sun Oil's plant is that almost
all raw materials including ingredients (base oils and additives) and packages are
allowed to import duty-free for blending and filling. All finished lubes are able
to go out of the economic zone duty free for all subsequent distribution to the
rest of China. At present, all lube importers are required to pay heavy import tax.
Therefore, lubes produced from China Sun Oil plant will be far more competitive
than others in the marketplace.
Secondly, the quality of products produced from the plant is quite
satisfactory. The plant possesses a well-equipped laboratory for quality control
and manufacturing process testing. In addition, the laboratory has research
facilities for new product development.
Moreover, the demand for 4-litre pack of automotive lubes has been
mounting high in China. It exerts considerable pressure on Shell to meet the
market demand. China Sun Oil plant is incorporated with advanced filling
facilities for small packs which in this connection will alleviate somewhat the
pressure on its existing plant and provides flexibility to meet ad hoc requirements.
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It is worth noting that the competitors are not passive in China. In 1986,
Mobil Oil Hong Kong Limited (MOHK) announced the signing of an agreement
with China for the supply, blending and packaging of Mobil products at a
manufacturing plant in Shanghai. The mew agreement was signed between
MOHK, Sinopec International and Shanghai Gao-qiao Petrochemical
International Trade Company. It is expected that the plant will be fully
operational by the end of 1990. Then, it will be a new threat to Shell's position
in China's lubes market.
Better Relationship with Sinopec
If Shell is really going to invest in China Sun Oil plant, then the relationship
with Sinopec will be promoted. In fact, Shell can enjoy a lot of intangible benefits
from this relationship. First of all, Sinopec's extensive connection with various
government departments and officials can avoid most of the bureaucratic red
tape. Shell can save time and resources in dealing with the bureaucrats.
Moreover, it is almost certain that Sinopec will be more eager to get all products
from the plant sold to the market.
On the other hand, not only can Shell gain a more competitive
position in lubes market, but also in offshore oil exploration. In 1985 and 1986,
Shell won two offshore oil exploration and development contracts in the South
China Sea. With China's determination to increase crude oil output, there will be
more opportunities in oil exploration and development in the future. Perhaps,
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better relationship with Sinopec might make Shell has upper-hand over its
competitors in contract bidding.
In fact, the expansion capacity of Shell's Tsing Yi plant is very limited. In
particular, the rapid urbanization of HK has already gradually turned Tsing Yi
into a densely populated residential area. It is not appropriate nor acceptable to
further expand its Tsing Yi plant in the future. Furthermore, if Shell intended to
develop the larger South East Asia market, the Shekou plant would be a very
good opportunity for it to expand its production capacity.
However, there also exists disadvantages in acquiring the Shekou plant.
Firstly, profits earned from the plant have to share with the Chinese partner. So,
Shell will earn less profit than running the plant by itself.
Secondly, difference in management approach may create disputes between
joint venture partners in the future. The pace of decision making will also be
hindered by the red tape. Finally, it is possible that Shell's overseas market will
be exploited by the joint venture partner once the plant fully loaded.
However, according to my analysis about the investment climate ana
strategic advantages of PRC investment, it seems that the advantages outweigh
the disadvantages involved in investing in Sun Oil plant.
Since the above analysis is just a qualitative one, it is very difficult, if not
impossible, to quantify the advantages and disadvantages so as to come up with
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an objective standard of measurement. Different investors will place different
weights on the same factors. The final decision is a matter of personal judgement.
In this connection, I will perform a quantitative analysis of the investment




QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES
Some people may akin making an investment decision in PRC to putting
money in Las Vagas Casino- you may either earn a lot or lose everything you
have in one day. Although this analogy has exaggerated the reality, to a certain
extent it reflects the attitude of investors towards PRC investment.
For the risky nature of PRC investment, a comprehensive evaluation about
the project is essential. In this chapter, I will evaluate the respective economic
benefits of the three alternatives by the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method.
Of course, these quantitative economic analysis of the investment project is not
sufficient, we should also take strategic considerations and the overall investment
climate of China into account before we make the final decision.
Discounted Cash Flow Method
Basically, the three alternatives are mutually exclusive. Shell must decide
which one of the three alternatives is the best to the company. Generally
speaking, the one which can generate the highest value to the company is the
best alternative. But, how to calculate the value of these investment projects?
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Some people may employ the Payback Method by simply adding up the cash
generated from the investment project to see how long it will take to cover the
capital investment. The one with the shortest payback period will be chosen.
However, it has the disadvantages of ignoring the time value of money and the
cash generated after the payback period. The investment of Shell is a relatively
long-term one, so the time value of cash generated from the investment is a very
important consideration. This implies we should discount the cash generated from
these investment projects to present value in order to have the same basis of
comparison. Therefore, we employ the DCF method to evaluate these
alternatives.
Since the real situation of the investment project is very complicated. so it
is impossible nor desirable to incorporate everything into our model of analysis.
In this connection, we need to make some simplified assumptions to allow the
more relevant parameters stand out on the one hand, and to make the model
have greater generalization power on the other.
Assumptions
1) Component costs are the same for different alternatives
Although lube-oil production is a hi-tech industry, the underlying theory is
quite simple. Basically, it is a process of combining base oils with additives to
form the final products- lube oils. By using different type of base oils or
additives, or different composition of base oils and additives will then generate
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different type of lube oils.
It requires technologically advanced equipment to maintain a high degree
of precision of the composition of base oils and additives throughout the whole
manufacturing process.
The supply of base oils will be mainly from Dalien if Shell decides to build
the plant in Tsing Yi. The prices of base oils from Dalien and Maoming are not
expected to differ too much. Whereas the supply of additives will be from the UK
no matter which alternatives Shell will finally choose. So, we can assume that the
component costs are the same for all of the three alternatives.
According to lubeoil production experts of Shell, the estimated component
costs are as follows:
HK$1,755/tonneBase oil costs
HK$1,090/tonneAdditives costs
Finished lubeoil costs: HK$3,900/tonne
2) Distribution cost is the same for different alternatives
It is obvious that the distribution cost will be different for plants in different
location. However, due to the geographical proximity of Shekou and Tsing Yi, we
may assume that there is no significant differences in distribution cost between
Shekou plant and Tsing Yi plant.
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3) No significant discrepancy between estimated and actual demand
The projected demands in both China and HK are estimated by a market
research and analysis team of Shell on the basis of the past performance,
consumption pattern, market shares and future economic development of HK and
China. It is a very complicated calculation which is out of the scope of this paper.
Here, I will just take the estimated data of projected demand from Shell for the
calculation of cash flow later.
4) Both local and international inflation rate are zero
In other words, all cash flow are deflated to 1989's monetary value so that
we can use one discount rate for all periods.
Parameters
The DCF model consists of a number of parameters. These parameters
which take different values under different situations formed the basis of our
analysis. Since the estimation of the values of parameters requires strong
technical background and experience in lube blending industry, so I will not




The tax rate depends on the country where the plant is located. If Shell
acquire the Shekou plant, then according to the preferential treatment to joint
venture in SEZs the tax rate is 7.5% in the first ten years and 15% in the
'following years.
There is no such preferential treatment in HK. The tax rate is totally
determined by the government. According to the past track record, the tax rate
in HK always lies between 15-17%. So, it is quite reasonable to assume that the
tax rate is 16% in my analysis.
2) Average lube oil value
According to the Marketing Director of Shell, the types of lube oils that will
produced in Shekou plant will be different from those in Tsing Yi plant for
strategic reasons, so the average value of output will vary slightly.
Table 3









In addition, outputs from A, and A2 are required to serve eotn riong r ong
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and China markets. So, part of the ouputs from A, (A2) must be exported to
China (Hong Kong). Thus, the import duties, which is partly borne by the
company, will lower the average value of outputs. On the contrary, plants in A3
are designed to serve local markets only so that import/export can be avoided.
This explains why the average value of output in A3 is higher than that in A,
and A2.
3) Plant throughput
It is estimated on the basis of the projected future demand of lube oils in
China and HK.
Table 4










Capital Expenditure (million HK$)
101.4Alt. 1
74.1Alt.2
66.3 (Tsing Yi)Alt. 3
5 8.5 (Shekou)
For Al, the HK$101.4 million capital expenditure is mainly used for the
construction of the Tsing Yi plant (which included installation of equipments and
facilities). Due to the higher material and labour costs in Hong Kong, the cpatial
expenditure is the highest among the three alternatives.
The capital expenditure of A2 is divided into two parts: 1) to acquire the
Shekou plant and 2) to expand the capacity of the Shekou plant. Since the
original plant capacity is only about 50,000 mtpa, which is a little bit lower than
Shell's required capacity of 55,000 mpta, so additional investment is needed to
expand the plant to the required level of capacity. This explains why the capital
expenditure in A2 (HK$74.1 million) is higher than that of A3's Shekou plant
(HK$58.5 million).
For A3, the capital expenditure is simply to construct the Tsing Yi plant
and to acquire Shekou plant respoectively.
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5) Operating expenses (million HK$)
Table 6






















Alternative 2 (Shekou plant only)
19931990 1992 1994-2000Year 1991
Personnel
No.




























Utilities. 0.030.030.030.030.03Air 0.040.040.040.040.04Electricity 0.260.260.260.260.26Steam 0.000.000.000.000.00Others 0.330.330.330.330.33Total Utility Cost































151,755Unit base oil cost
281,090Unit additive cost
103,900Unit finished product cost
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The inventory can be calculated by the formula:

















By employing similar formula as above, we obtain
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Table 11
Account receivable (million HK$)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994-2000
Alt.l/Alt.2 6.14 6.47 7.686.94 8.22
3.50Alt.3 (Tsing Yi) 3.53 3.65 3.83 3.95
2.94 3.85 4.262.64 3.29(Shekou)
Account payable
HK$/mt days
151,755Unit base oil cost
281,090Unit additive cost
By employing similar formula as above, we obtain
Table 12









Putting all the values of parameter into the DCF model, we obtain a stream
of cash flow for each alternative. Then we can calculate the net present value and
internal rate of return of these alternatives. The results are summarised in the
following exhibits and tables.
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Table 13
Net Present Value (million HK$ )11
Alt.












Internal Rate of Return




According to the Lubricant Manager of Shell, the required rate of return for
investment in Hong Kong and China are 15% and 18% respectively. The higher
required rate of return for China investment is due to the higher political and
economic risks involved. Assuming the average inflation rate to be 6-7%, it
implies that the required rates of return for investment in Hong Kong and China
in my analysis, where inflatinn rate is assumed to be zero, are 8-9% and 11-12%
respectively. Therefore, all of the three alternatives are acceptable by this
In fact, cash flows of Tsing Yi plant is being over-
estimated since rental value of land is not included in my
calculation. Although Shell owns the Tsing Yi plant-site, we
should take the opportunity cost of the land into account.
Therefore, cash flows of A, and A3 are overestimate. However, evert
it does not affect our conclusion since A2 is stil
attractive alternative after all.
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standard.
It is obvious that the Alternative 2 has the highest economic value to Shell.
Both the NPV and IRR are the highest among the three alternatives. Coupled
with the favourable investment climate and valuable strategic advantages it
brings, to acquire the Shekou plant seems to be a sensible choice.
Actually, there are so many such profitable investment projects in China.
but we can see a lot of investors still hesitate to put their money in China. What
is the reason?
In fact, there are some hidden costs still have not been taken into account
in the above analysis. Usually, these hidden costs appear in a joint venture as
problems in management and operation. Most of the joint ventures fail because
of management and operational problems.
If we trace back to the reason of failure, we will find that lack of mutual
understanding between partners is the root cause. The two sides always tend to
restrict their thinking in their original framework. Even if they are using the same
word, the meaning is quite different due to ideology and cultural differences. Just
after they entered a satisfactory contract, they would find that problems come
out from the most trivial areas.
Therefore, in order to make the deal to be a successful one we should
minimize the hidden costs through the contract terms. Given the favourable
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investment environment in China whether the investor can successfully fight for
terms and condition favourable to the company on the negotiation table is critical
to investor's decision. In the next chapter, I'll try to the ideal terms Shell should




KEY FACTORS FOR SHEKOU JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT
Although Alternative 2 seems to be very attractive and profitable from our
previous analysis, it does not mean that Shell can immediately enter a joint
venture agreement with Sinopec. In fact, there are some very important but
subtle factors need to be considered before signing the contract. The negotiation
will be between three parties: Shell, Sun Oil and Sinopec. Shell should have a
very clear idea about its bottom-line in the process of negotiation.
Ideal Joint Venture Agreement
The following suggested terms and conditions which should ideally included
in the joint venture agreement are totally from the viewpoint of Shell. Perhaps,
Shell may need to make some concession so as to reach a mutually beneficial
agreement. Nonetheless, it is the target Shell should aim at.
a) The plant should be completely managed by Shell
In China, the most common problem faced by joint ventures is dispute over
.management style. Due to the differences in culture and ideology, mutual
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understanding between the two parties is minimal. In fact, the reason why Sun
want to sell its share is mainly because of management problems. So, the quickest
way to solve the problem is to allow one side to take over the company's
management completely.
However, it is very likely that Shell cannot achieve this target. If it is the
case, then the agreement should clearly write down the authorities,
responsibilities and duties of both sides.
b) Limit the joint venture to processing deal only
It implies that selling and marketing of products should be handled by Shell.
The purpose is just to maximize Shell's benefit in the deal since only the
processing margin will be shared between the two parties, while Shell can retain
1
the whole marketing margin2.
c) Free to vurchase base oils from any source
The joint venture should have the freedom to choose the supplier if
Maoming's base oils cannot live up to the required standard.
d) Replace Sun Oil completely
12The previous calculation of NPV has already taken the
marketing margin into account. That means I assume that
marketing margin is shared between Shell and Sinopec.
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Sun Oil should completely withdraw from the joint venture after Shell had
taken over its share. All lubes should also sell under Shell's brand name.
Factors Where Shell should be Firm
Of course, in the above suggested joint agreement, some degree of flexibility
should be allowed in negotiations. However, there are two aspects that Shell
should not make concession under any circumstances.
a) Direct competition from Sinopec is not allowed in overseas market
Since Shell has substantial involvement in south East Asian market, the
lower cost lubes from the Shekou plant would hamper Shell's share in these
markets if direct competition is allowed.
b) Share marketing margin with Sun Oil is not acceptable
Sun Oil may require Shell to share marketing margin with it for Sun has
already develop some distribution channels for China Sun Oil in some
marketplaces. But it is totally unacceptable. Since it will not only reduce Shell
profits, but also will leak business confidentiality to Sun. Perhaps, a better way
is to pay Sun Oil once-all in the form of goodwill in acquiring its share.
Of course, the above suggested conditions of agreement are not exhaustive.
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In actual negotiation, there are even more factors needed to be considered. The
above suggestions are just trying to list out the most important factors in




According to the top executives of Shell and Sun, we find that they share the
same analysis in making their investment decision in China:
1) evaluate the investment climate of the PRC;
2) consider the strategic advantages;
3) analyze the financial benefits of the investment projects
4) consider all possible practical operational problems in the investment.
According this framework of analysis, I find that the most attractive
investment alternative is A2 (acquire the Shekou plant only). However, in the
first 2 stages of our analysis, it depends much on the subjective judgement of the
investor's perceived investment climate in China and the value he/she places on
the strategic advantages of the investment projects. Undoubtedly, the political risk
of investment in the PRC is greater than that in Hong Kong. So, in the first
instance, whether Shell will take this investment alternative depends on the risks
it is willing to take.
On the other hand, given the favourable investment climate in the PRC and
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the enormous economic values the investment project will bring, the most critical
consideration for investors in this stage is the contractual terms in the joint
venture agreement. He/She should be able to identify the ideal terms and
conditions and the bottom-line during negotiation so as to minimize the hidden
cost of future operation.
In fact, we can apply this framework of analysis to other PRC investment
decision. We can also perform risk analysis by assigning probabilities to every
stage of analysis in the decision model so that the investor can have more
understanding about the risks involved and the economic value of all investment
alternatives. Of course, the final decision will depends on investors' judgement



















China Sun Oil's Products
Engine Oils
Universal engine oils for gasoline and diesel engines
Special gasoline engine oils for maximum engine protection in stop and go
service
High TBN Marine engine oils
Two stroke engine oils for motorcycles, outboard engines and other two stroke
applications.
Gear Lubricants
Automotive gear oils meeting requirements of Mil-L-2105C and Mack GOG
in single and multigrade viscosities
Heavy duty extreme pressure industrial gear oils.
Wav Lubricants
Special lubricants for machine tool ways and slides.
Hydraulic Oils
Anti-wear hydraulic oils meeting the specifications of all major hydraulic pump
manufacturers in a wide variety of viscosity ranges to meet the requirements of
virtually all hydraulic systems.
Metalworking Fluids
- Oils and fluids to handle a wide variety of metals- both ferrous and non-
ferrous
- Oils and fluids for a wide variety of machining operations from mild to the most
severe
- Heat Treating Oils.
Machine Lubricating Oils




ALTERNATIVE 1: TSING YI PLANT ONLY

























-10.52 -11.09 -11.90Total W.C.




ALTERNATIVE 2: SHEKOU PLANT ONLY
(Cashflow in million HK$)
Year
20011995 1996 1997 1999 200019981990 1991 1993 19941989 1992
22.79 22.7922.79 22.79 22.79 22.7921.30 22.79Total Gross Margin 17.02 17.95 19.26
-74.10Capital Exp'd
-6.74 -6.74-6.74 -6.74 -6.74 -6.74-6.74 -6.74-6.74 -6.74 -6.74 0.00Depreciation
-5.08-5.08 -5.08 -5.08 -5.08-4.06 -5.08 -5.08-5.05 -5.06 -5.07Operating Expenses
0.0010.97Taxable Income 10.97 10.97 10.97 10.97 10.976.22 7.46 10.976.16 9.49
0.001.651.65 1.65 1.65 1.651.65Tax 0.820.47 0.46 0.56 0.71
0.009.339.33 9.33 9.33Net Income A/T 9.33 9.335.76 5.70 6.90 8.78 10.15
0.006.746.74 6.74 6.74 6.74Add: Depreciation 6.746.74 6.74 6.74 6.74 6.74
0.0016.06Cash Flows 16.06 16.06 16.06 16.06 16.0612.49 12.44 15.52 16.8913.64
Working Capital:
-14.42-10.77 -11.36 -12.19 -13.48 -14.42 -14.42 -14.42 -14.42 -14.42 -14.42Inventory
-8.22 -8.22-8.22 -8.22-6.14 -8.22 -8.22-6.47 -6.94 -7.68 -8.22Account Receivable
8.558.55Account Payable 8.55 8.55 8.556.39 8.556.74 8.557.23 7.99
-14.09-14.09 -14.09 -14.09 -14.09 -14.09-10.52 -11.09 -11.90 -13.17 -14.09Total W.C.
-10.52 -0.57 -0.92-0.81 -1.27 14.090.000.00Change in W.C. 0.00 0.000.00 0.00
-74.10 14.0916.0616.06NET CASHFLOW 16.06 16.06 16.0616.061.97 11.87 12.83 14.25 15.97
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ALTERNATIVE 3: TSING YI PLANT
(Cashflow in million HK$)
Year
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total Gross Margin 13.10 13.23 13.67 14.32 14.80 14.80 14.80 14.80 14.80 14.80 14.80
-66.30Capital Exp'd
-6.03 -6.03 -6.03 -6.03 -6.03 -6.03 -6.03 -6.03 -6.03Depreciation -6.03 -6.03 0.00
-2.80 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50Operating Expenses
Taxable Income 4.27 3.70 4.14 4.79 5.27 5.27 5.27 5.27 5.27 5.27 5.27 0.00
Tax 0.68 0.59 0.66 0.77 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.00
Net Income A/T 3.59 3.11 3.48 4.03 4.43 4.43 4.43 4.43 4.43 4.43 4.43 0.00
Add: Depreciation 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 0.00
Cash Flows 9.62 9.14 9.51 10.05 10.46 10.46 10.46 10.46 10.46 10.46 10.46 0.00
Working Capital:
-6.14 -6.20 -6.41 -6.72 -6.94 -6.94 -6.94Inventory -6.94 -6.94 -6.94 -6.94
-3.50 -3.53 -3.65 -3.83 -3.95 -3.95 -3.95Account Receivable -3.95 -3.95 -3.95 -3.95
Account Payable 3.64 3.68 3.80 3.98 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.11
-6.00 -6.05 -6.26 -6.57 -6.78Total W. C. -6.78 -6.78 -6.78 -6.78 -6.78 -6.78
-6.00 -0.05 -0.21 -0.31 -0.21Change in W.C. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.78
-66.30NET CASHFLOW 3.62 9.09 9.30 9.74 10.25 10.46 10.46 10.46 10.46 10.46 10.46 6.78
60Exhibit 3 (Cont'd)
ALTERNATIVE 3: SHEKOU PLANT
(Cashflow in million HK$)
Year
200120001998 19991997199619951994199319921990 19911989




0.008.548.548.548.54 8.548.548.544.54 6.842.57 3.06Taxable Income
0.001.281.281.281.281.281.280.640.510.19 0.23 0.34Tax
0.007.267.267.26 7.267.267.267.902.38 2.83 4.20 6.33Net Income A/T
0.005.325.325.325.325.325.325.325.32 5.325.32 5.32Add: Depreciation
0.0012.5812.5812.5812.5812.5812.5813.227.70 8.15 11.659.52Cash Flows
Working Capital:
-7.48-7.48-7.48-7.48-7.48-7.48-7.48-4.63 -5.15 -5.78 -6.76Inventory
-4.26-4.26-4.26-4.26-4.26-4.26-4.26-2.64 -2.94 -3.29 -3.85Account Receivable
4.444.444.444.444.444.442.74 4.443.06 3.43 4.01Account Payable
-7.30--7.30-7.30-7.30-7.30-7.30-7.30-4.53 -5.03 -5.64 -6.60Total W.C.
-4.53 -0.70-0.50 -0.61 -0.96 7.300.000.000.000.000.000.00Change in W.C.
-58.50 7.3012.5812.5812.5812.5812.5812.583.17 12.52NET CASHFLOW 7.65 10.698.91
NET CASHFLOW CONTRIBUTED BY ALTERNATIVE 3:
6.78-66.30 10.4610.4610.4610.4610.4610.463.62Cashflow (Tsing Yi) 10.259.09 9.30 9.74
3.65-29.25 6.296.296.296.296.296.291.58 3.83 6.264.45 5.34Cashflow (Shekou)
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